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Legal positivism is a theory about the nature of law. Primarily British in
origin, the theory has survived competition with Legal Realism and natural law
doctrine. Its widespread influence in American legal circles is acknowledged by
its most vigorous critics. One such critic, Ronald Dworkin, has even suggested
that legal positivism is part of our "ruling theory of law" and is accepted "by
most working and academic lawyers who hold views on jurisprudence. ' The
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A., 1959, University
of Rochester; M.A., 1961, Columbia University; J.D., 1970, Cornell University. The author thanks
Patrick Hubbard for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii, 16 (rev. ed. 1978). Dworkin may exaggerate
the influence of legal positivism in America, but American jurisprudential writing contains numerous
indications of acceptance of one or more of the positivist theses discussed in this article. See, e.g.,
D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 104-05 (1984) (indicating acceptance of the Separation
Thesis); S. MUNZER, LEGAL VALIDn'Y 3-4, 65 (1972) (indicating acceptance of the Validity Thesis);
R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTrAuSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 101, 112, 122-25 (1982) (indicating
acceptance of the Validity Thesis and Separation Thesis and possible acceptance of the Legal
Obligation Thesis); Munzer, Validity and Legal Conflicts, 82 YALE L.J. 1140, 1172 (1973) (indicating
acceptance of the Validity Thesis) [hereinafter Validity and Legal Conflicts]; Richards, Rules, Policies,
and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional Adjuication, 11 GA.
L. REX'. 1069, 1075, 1095-96, 1111-12 (1977) (indicating acceptance of the Separation Thesis). One
observer has noted that the jurisprudential work of H.L.A. Hart (one of the three leading contemporary positivists discussed in this article) "has made a strong impression in the United States
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purpose of this article is to show that contemporary positivism is incompatible
with the realities of American case law and should be rejected by American
lawyers.
Section I of this article examines three central theses in the works of the
leading contemporary positivists, H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Neil MacCormick. The three theses distinguish contemporary legal positivism from other
analytical philosophies of law and may be stated as follows:
(1) by applying criteria contained in a rule of recognition generally accepted
by the courts, one can usually ascertain whether a rule is legally valid (the
"Validity Thesis");
(2) the criteria for legal validity need not include moral criteria, and so
far as they do not, the legal validity of a rule and the moral quality of the
rule are two separate issues (the "Separation Thesis"); and
(3) a citizen has a strict legal obligation to comply with any legally valid
rule that requires or forbids specified conduct, and judges have a strict legal
obligation to apply any legally valid rule that covers the legal issue being decided
(the "Legal Obligation Thesis").2
In advancing these theses, the contemporary positivists purport to describe the
"legal point of view," a distinctive viewpoint of judges who work within any
3
legal system.

and has gained him many adherents among the younger generation of jurists interested in legal
theory." Bodenheimer, Hart, Dworkin, and the Problem of Judicial Lawmaking Discretion, 11 GA. L.
REv. 1143, 1150 (1977).

2. Two additional theses are common to Hart, Raz, and MacCormick. The "Social Sources
Thesis" asserts that legal rules have social sources, that rules become law through the social activities
of human beings. See N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 20, 25, 159 (1981) (summarizing Hart's
belief that rules have social sources) [hereinafter N. MAcCoRMICK]; N. MAcCoRMICK & 0. WEINBERGER, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW 4 (1986); N. MACCORMICK, supra, at 6, 29, 30, 33
(showing MacCormick's agreement with Hart); J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw 37-40, 46-47
(1979) (Raz's "sources thesis" combines the Separation Thesis and Social Sources Thesis) [hereinafter AUTHORITY OF LAW]. The "Discretion Thesis" asserts that in some cases, legal standards
do not dictate a particular decision and that judges sometimes have discretion from the legal point
of view. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 124, 132 (1961) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF LAW];
H. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 148, 161 (1982) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON BENTHAM]; N. MACCORMICK,
supra, at 130; N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 249-51 (1978) [hereinafter
LEGAL REASONING]; AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra, at 113; Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,
81 YALE L.J. 823, 845-48 (1972) [hereinafter Legal Principles].
Neither the Social Sources Thesis nor the Discretion Thesis distinguishes legal positivism;
non-positivists generally accept both theses. If the Social Sources Thesis is interpreted as a thesis
about the immediate sources of law rather than the ultimate sources or inspiration, it is acceptable
to anyone who recognizes that norms are introduced into legal institutions only through the social
actions of human beings. Only those who believe in an authoritative and pre-existing legal answer
for every legal issue that arises reject the Discretion Thesis. Few, if any, hold such an extreme
view, although Dworkin comes close. See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIET'
58, 83-84 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977) (suggesting that for practical purposes, there is always
a right answer).
3. The positivists recognize that the truth, if any, of answers to legal questions or other
normative questions is always relative to some point of view. Positivist theory focuses on the legal
point of view, the point of view of judges and other legal officials. In attempting to describe this
point of view, the positivists engage in a hermeneutic enterprise. MacCormick defines the "her-
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Section II of this article surveys American judicial attitudes concerning case
law and shows that the Validity Thesis and Legal Obligation Thesis are disproved. These two theses suggest a judicial point of view that is not prevalent
in the realm of American case law. The survey confirms some of the observations made by the Legal Realists in their attacks on systematic models of
law. As section III suggests, the Validity Thesis and Legal Obligation Thesis
probably cannot be modified to conform to the realities of American case law
without sacrificing the positivists' basic model of a system of rules. Legal positivism should, therefore, be rejected as an analytical approach to American
law.
I.

THREE THESES OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL POSITIVISM

This portion of the article examines the Validity Thesis, Separation Thesis,
and Legal Obligation Thesis and notes certain relationships among them. First,
however, a preliminary matter involving the distinction between rules and principles must be considered.
A.

Rules and Principles

This article considers the three
treatment of rules, Hart, Raz, and
three positivists have not, however,
legal status of what are frequently

theses only as they apply to rules. In their
MacCormick are on common ground. The
developed a common position regarding the
called "principles. ' 4 Hart often gives the

meneutic" approach as one that seeks to explain human actions and practices through an interpretation of the meaning they have for those who take part in the actions or practices. N.
MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 29-30; see also H. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
13 (1983) (need for hermeneutic method portraying rule-governed behavior as it appears to its
participants who share certain standards); N. MACCORMICK & 0. WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at
134-35 (hermeneutic approach recognizes "the intimate interconnection of the rules people in social
groups observe and the attitudes they have on the basis of the values to which they adhere," but
does not necessarily subscribe to the same values). This hermeneutic approach gives contemporary
positivism greater explanatory power than the earlier positivist theories of Bentham, Austin, and
Kelsen.
The MacCormick-Hart approach is not the only possible hermeneutic (interpretive) approach;
one could interpret social practices without restricting the focus to the meanings attached by the
participants. However, this article uses "hermeneutic" in the MacCormick-Hart sense.
4. The positivists have not even agreed on the distinction between "rules" and "principles."
Hart does not offer any such distinction. Raz suggests that rules prescribe relatively specific acts,
whereas principles prescribe highly unspecific actions. Legal Pdnciples, supra note 2, at 838. MaeCormick,
on the other hand, indicates that rules are norms designed as means to bring about end-states
expressed in legal principles. LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 156; see also N. MACCORMICK &
0. WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 73-74 (principles express the underlying purposes of detailed rules).
But MacCormick offers another distinction when he states that rules can conclusively justify judicial
decisions, whereas principles cannot. LEGAL R.ASONINo, supra note 2, at 180. This latter distinction
is reminiscent of Dworkin's suggestion that legal rules are absolute, conclusive reasons for judicial
decisions, while legal principles are merely prima facie reasons which must be weighed. See R.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 24-27.
A simple rule-principle dichotomy is inadequate to classify the many uses of legal norms.
Norms guide mental inferences leading to decisions, and the way one uses a norm determines how
it should be classified. See G. GOTrLIEB, THE LoGIC OF CHOICE 35, 37 (1968). The same norm-
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impression that a legal system includes only rules and not principles.5 For
MacCormick, law includes rules and principles, but unlike legal rules, legal
principles are not directly identified by a rule of recognition. Legal principles
are principles that could explain and justify the valid legal rules identified by
the criteria in a rule of recognition. 6 MacCormick, therefore, words his Validity
Thesis (a thesis about the validating function of a rule of recognition) so that
it refers only to rules.7 Raz acknowledges that law includes both rules and
principles and suggests that a test can be constructed to identify legally valid
principles. The test is not found, however, in any rule of recognition." Like
Hart and MacGormick, Raz advances a Validity Thesis that focuses on rules
of recognition and thus applies to rules, but not principles.
To state the Validity Thesis, Separation Thesis, and Legal Obligation Thesis
so they apply to the same domain of legal norms and are also acceptable to
all three contemporary positivists, each thesis is worded to apply only to rules.
This article attacks contemporary positivism only with respect to its theses concerning the validity and binding status of rules.
Dworkin's attack on contemporary positivism is different from this article's
attack. Dworkin argues that Hart's positivism is defective because it focuses on
legal rules and ignores legal principles, which impose additional constraints on
judges and thus render law more determinate and less discretionary than Hart

formulation may be used in a number of different ways, including at least the following four: (1)
the person using the norm may regard the norm as providing sufficient grounds for his decision,
and regard the decision indicated by the norm as mandatory, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at
24-25 (concept of rule); (2) the person using the norm may regard the norm as providing sufficient
grounds for his decision, and regard the decision indicated by the norm as required except when
the reasons for not following the norm outweigh the reasons for following it, see W. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD 19-20 (1930) (concept of prima facie duty); (3) the person using the norm
may regard the norm as providing insufficient grounds for his decision, which grounds must,
however, always be given weight, see Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
138, 151, 155-56 (1984) (concept of principle); (4) the person using the norm may regard the
norm as a mere guideline or rule-of-thumb and feel free to treat the norm as providing sufficient
grounds for his decision, or to completely disregard the norm, whichever seems appropriate in the
circumstances, see Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 19-24, 28 (1955) (summary view
of rules). In uses (1), (2), and (4), the norm provides (or can provide) sufficient grounds for a
decision; in use (3), it does not. In uses (1), (2), and (3), the norm always has force; in use (4),
it does not always have force. In use (1), the decision indicated by the norm is regarded as
mandatory. (If the norm has exceptions, they would be enumerated in a complete statement of
the norm, and the norm so stated would be mandatory.) In uses (2), (3), and (4), the decision
indicated by the norm is not mandatory. Accounting for each of these four distinctive uses requires
something more than a rule-principle dichotomy.
This article assumes that the word "rule" refers to some non-empty set of norms that Hart,
Raz, MacCormick, and those evaluating the positivists' theses would regard as rules.
5. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 97-107. But see id. at 121; EssAYs orN BENTHMAI,
supra note 2, at 160 (mentioning principles). Some commentators suggest that Hart's concept of
rules is broad enough to include what others call "principles." Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 1153;
Legal Principles, supra note 2, at 845.
6. LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 232-35, 238, 240.
7. Id. at 54, 244.
8. Legal Principles, supra note 2, at 852-54.
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recognizes. 9 This article will attack contemporary positivism without mentioning
legal principles. This article suggests that the positivists do not even give an
accurate account of the identification and binding status of legal rules and that,
contrary to Dworkin, the law is even less determinate and more discretionary
than the positivists are willing to admit.
B.

The Validity Thesis

The Validity Thesis asserts that by applying criteria contained in a rule of
recognition generally accepted by the courts, one can usually ascertain whether
a rule is legally valid. MacCormick provides a concise statement of the thesis.
According to MacCormick, a central tenet of positivist legal theory is
that every legal system comprises, or at least includes, a set of rules
identifiable by reference to common criteria of recognition; and that what
constitutes these criteria as criteria of recognition for a legal system is
shared acceptance by the judges of that system that their duty is to apply
rules identified by reference to them.' 0
MacCormick refers to this tenet as the "validity thesis."" He suggests that
legal validity is established by means of the criteria of recognition and uses the
term "rule of recognition" in referring to the rule containing these criteria of
12
recognition.
The concept of a rule of recognition originated with Hart. According to
Hart, "[i]f the question is raised whether some suggested rule is legally valid,
we must, in order to answer the question, use a criterion of validity provided
by some other rule.' ' 3 That other rule is the rule of recognition, which
will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule ... to
be supported by [social pressure] .... [W]hat is crucial is the acknowledgment of reference to the [rule of recognition] as authoritative, i.e., as
the proper way of disposing of doubts as to the existence of the rule.
Where there is such an acknowledgment there is ...
a rule for conclusive
14
identification of the primary rules of obligation.

9.
10.

R.

DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 16-17, 28-44.
LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 54. The quoted passage combines the Validity Thesis

and part of the Legal Obligation Thesis.
11.

Id. at 53.

12. Id.at 53, 240, 244.
13. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 103.
14. Id. at 92. For Hart, "primary rules of obligation" regulate the duties of citizens and
differ from "secondary rules" which govern the identification, alteration, and enforcement of primary rules; a rule of recognition is a secondary rule of identification. Id.at 78-79, 91-93, 97. For
purposes of simplification, this article generally ignores other secondary rules and focuses on the
relationship between rules of recognition and primary rules.
Assume that the courts accept and use a rule that any ordinance signed by the Chief of Public
Safety is valid law. Assume that Robert Parish, the incumbent Chief, signs an ordinance prohibiting
doctors from shooting birds within the city limits. In the positivists' model, the ordinance is a
primary rule of obligation and is legally valid because it meets the criterion provided in a rule of
recognition (or a rule that is part of a more complex rule of recognition) accepted by the courts.
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Hart acknowledges that a rule of recognition, like any other rule, has a fringe
of vagueness or open texture; thus a few cases will exist where it cannot be
clearly ascertained whether a given primary rule is legally valid. 15 Accordingly,
the word "usually" is used in stating the Validity Thesis. Hart maintains,
however, that the criteria in the rule of recognition generally leave no doubt
16
as to the validity or invalidity of a given primary rule.
Hart believes that valid primary rules can be identified by means of a rule
of recognition and that a rule of recognition is identified by empirical observation of the actual practices of courts. Hart states that a rule of recognition
exists if it is accepted and used as a practice by legal officials; its existence is
a matter of fact.1 7 Acceptance of a rule of recognition provides a necessary
empirical foundation for the existence of a legal system; it makes law systematic.
In the absence of an accepted rule of recognition, there would be general
uncertainty as to which rules are rules of the legal regime. However, when a
rule of recognition has been accepted, we can identify a legal system consisting
of a rule of recognition and all the other rules it validates. 8
Raz presents the Validity Thesis as a thesis about the limits of law. According to Raz, "the law has limits: it does not contain all the justifiable
standards (moral or other) ....

It comprises only .

.

. those standards having

the proper institutional connection."' 9 Raz assumes that any rule is either legally
valid or legally invalid.20 He asserts that the test for validity is found in a rule
of recognition: "The legal validity of a rule is established . . . by showing that

it conforms to tests of validity laid down by some other rules of the system
which can be called rules of recognition.' '21 Raz suggests that the ultimate rules
of recognition can be identified as a matter of social fact: "[T]hose ultimate
rules of recognition are binding which are actually practised and followed by
22
the courts."
Thus, for Raz, Hart, and MacCormick, the legal validity of a putative rule
depends upon whether the rule conforms to criteria contained in a rule of
recognition generally accepted as a judicial practice. It is important to note that
the contemporary positivists apply their Validity Thesis not only to the realms
of constitutional, statutory, and administrative law, but also to the realm of
case law.23 In his discussion of case law, Hart notes "the acknowledgment of

15.
16.

Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 148-49.

17.
18.
19.

Id. at 97-98, 107, 112-13.
Id. at 89-90, 92, 97, 107, 112-13.
AUTHORITY OF L W, supra note 2, at 45. See generally id. at 111-15 (discussing the limits

of law).
20. Id. at 146 n.1.
21. Id. at 150-51. Raz has slightly modified Hart's doctrine of the rule of recognition. Whereas
Hart conceives of a legal system as having one rule of recognition that is neither valid nor invalid,
but simply accepted, Raz conceives of a legal system as having a hierarchy of rules of recognition,
each of which is valid. Id.
22. Id. at 151.
23. In this article, the term "case law" refers only to judicial rulings on legal issues not
governed by any constitution, statute, or administrative regulation.
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precedent as a criterion of legal validity" and claims that "the result of the
English system of precedent has been to produce . . . a body of rules of which
a vast number . . . are as determinate as any statutory rule." '2 4 Hart regards
the doctrine of precedent as a rule of recognition component that enables us
to identify certain case law rules as valid. In a modern legal system, "the rule
of recognition is . . . complex: the criteria for identifying the law are multiple
and commonly include a written constitution, enactment by a legislature, and

judicial precedents." '2 Raz claims that judge-made law is legally valid and binding, just as much
as enacted legislation.2 6 In both realms of law, validity is determined by a rule
of recognition. "A rule becomes binding by being laid down in one case as a
precedent. It does not have to wait until it is accepted in a series of cases to
be binding. It is binding because of the doctrine of precedent which is part of
our rule of recognition." ' 27 Because Raz uses "valid" and "binding" as equivalent terms, 28 he can be understood to claim that a case law rule becomes valid
by being laid down in one case as a precedent, pursuant to the English rule
of recognition. MacCormick suggests that common law legal systems have rules
of recognition that identify certain case law rules as valid, 29 and that valid case
0
law rules are identified by discovering ratio decidendi in precedent cases.3
The Validity Thesis is widely regarded as one of the defining characteristics
of legal positivism. 31 As a thesis about what counts as valid law from the legal
point of view, it plays a central role in positivist theory. But what does "valid"

mean? Raz uses "legally valid" interchangeably with "legally binding.'

'32

Raz

states that "[a] legally valid rule is one which has the normative effects (in
law) which it claims to have.''32 To say a rule is legally valid is to say that
from the legal point of view, the rule ought to be followed. MacCormick also

24. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 131-32.
25. Id. at 98.
26. AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 113-14, 195.
27. Legal Principles, supra note 2, at 852-53.
28. See AUTHORITY or LAW, supra note 2, at 149.
29. See N. MAcComMICK & 0. WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 57; LEGAL REASONING, supra
note 2, at 133-34, 243-44.
30.

See LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 214-16.

31. See id. at 54, 61-62; Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. RFv. 969, 985-86 (1977). Non-positivists also recognize the central role
of the Validity Thesis in positivist theory. Fuller suggests that "the quest of positivism is for some
test which will designate plainly the law that is and distinguish it from the law that is merely
becoming or merely ought to be."

L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 34 (1940). Dworkin

lists three key tenets of positivism, the first of which is that the law is a set of rules identifiable
by specific criteria, by tests that distinguish valid legal rules from spurious legal rules. R. DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 17.
32. AUTHoRTY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 149. Raz acknowledges that he has drawn his notion
of validity from Hans Kelsen's. Id. at 150. According to Kelsen, to say that a norm is "valid"
means that it ought to be obeyed and applied (is binding). See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
10-11, 193 (M. Knight trans. 1967) [hereinafter PURE THEORY OF LAw]; Kelsen, On the Basis of
Legal Validity, 26 Am. J. JURISPRUDENCE 178, 180 (1981) [hereinafter On the Basis of Legal Validity].
33.

AUTHORTY or LAw, supra note 2, at 149 (emphasis added).
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seems to use "valid" and "binding" interchangeably; 34 "legally valid" means
binding from the point of view of those who work within the legal system.3 5
Therefore, according to Raz and MacCormick, "legally valid" means binding
from the legal point of view.
For Hart, on the other hand, "legally valid" seems to mean satisfying the
criteria specified in the legal system's rule of recognition.- 6 Although a rule
acquires obligatory status by satisfying these criteria, Hart apparently does not
regard this status as part of the meaning of "legally valid." Hart's concept of
legal validity seems to focus exclusively on the preconditions a rule must satisfy
in order to enjoy the status of validity, and seems to ignore the deontological
significance of that status (the bindingness of the valid rule). Raz's and
MacCormick's concept, in contrast, seems to focus exclusively on the deontological significance of the status of validity, and ignores the preconditions a
rule must satisfy in order to enjoy that status.
These two different concepts merely capture two different aspects of one,
more complete, notion of "legally valid." ' 37 We call something "valid" when,
by virtue of its satisfying certain accepted criteria, it qualifies for a status that
entitles it to be respected and given effect in a particular way. Any status has
a dual aspect: the criteria that must be satisfied to attain the status, and the
appropriate way to treat things that have attained the status.3 8 "Valid" is thus
a Janus-word 39 which looks backward to the satisfaction of criteria and forward
to the practical significance of having satisfied the criteria. 4°

34. See LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 139.
35. See id. at 62.
36. To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by
the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that
the statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria provided

by the rule of recognition. This is incorrect only to the extent that it might obscure the
internal character of such statements....
THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2, at 100.
37. Dworkin interprets Hart's concept of legal validity as follows: "[R]ules binding because
they have been created in a manner stipulated by some secondary rule are called 'valid' rules."
R. DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 20. Dworkin's interpretation combines both aspects of legal validity
(satisfying legal criteria and being legally binding).
38. Status words are modal words. Unlike purely indicative or descriptive adjectives (e.g.,
"orange," "perpendicular," "earlier"), which simply state what is the case, modal adjectives (e.g.,
"impossible," "obligatory," "valid") suggest appropriate attitudes in the light of accepted criteria.
A modal concept like "impossible" or "valid" combines the criteria for its use with the practical
force of its use (a suggested attitude). Purely indicative adjectives, on the other hand, have only
criteria. To understand the meaning of "impossible," one must consider not only how one concludes
that something is impossible (namely, by applying criteria that vary from one field of endeavor to
another), but also what one does as a consequence of reaching that conclusion (namely, rule
something out). Similarly, to understand the meaning of "valid," one must consider both the
criteria to be met and the practical force or significance of a finding that those criteria have been
met. For discussions of this dual aspect of modal concepts, see S. TOULMIN, THE USS OF ARGUMENT
30-35 (1958); A. WHITE, MODAL THINKING 174-79 (1975).
39. Cf. P. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHics 146 (1957) (Janus-words do at least two logically connected
jobs at once).
40. See Validity and Legal Conflicts, supra note 1, at 1149-50.
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When we attribute legal validity to something, we acknowledge that it sat41
isfies certain legal criteria and is thus entitled to be treated as legally effective.
For example, when we say that a testamentary will is legally valid, we indicate
that it satisfies certain legal criteria, and we also suggest that it ought to be
admitted to probate and enforced by the court. Similarly, when we say that
a particular statutory rule is legally valid, we indicate that the rule satisfies
certain legal criteria and is thus entitled to be treated as legally binding. The
contemporary positivists should therefore acknowledge that "legally valid" signifies both "satisfying the rule of recognition criteria" and "binding from the
legal point of view. '"42 The positivists' Legal Obligation Thesis provides a more
precise notion of the binding nature of valid rules and will be examined after
the Separation Thesis.
C.

The Separation Thesis

The Separation Thesis asserts that the criteria for legal validity need not
include moral criteria, and so long as they do not, the legal validity of a rule
and the moral quality of the rule are two separate issues. Hart suggests that
the criteria of legal validity used in a legal system need not include an explicit
or tacit reference to morality. 43 The criteria might merely specify by whom,
and by what procedures, valid rules may be created. All rules that are valid
under the legal system's criteria of validity should be regarded as law, even
though some of these rules may offend society's morality or what we hold to
be an enlightened or true morality. 4 Therefore, a distinction exists between
41. Dictionary definitions of "valid" (in legal contexts) emphasize both aspects of validity.
"Valid" means executed with the proper formalities or authorized by law; "valid" also means
having legal strength, having binding force, incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (5th ed. 1979). "Valid" means having legal efficacy or force and
executed with the proper legal authority and formalities. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1302 (1984).
42. Whether both notions are included in the meaning of "legally valid" might seem to
depend on one's concept of "meaning." Assume that the meaning of an expression like "legally
valid" is its contribution to the meaning of utterances in which it occurs. Some philosophers restrict
the meaning of an utterance to the fixed, context-independent sense (and the resulting reference)
of the sentence being uttered, and distinguish meaning from illocutionary force (the kind of speech
act intended by the speaker, e.g., informing, ordering, warning). See J. AUSTIN, How TO DO THINGS
WITH WORDS 94, 100, 109 (2d ed. 1975); H. HART, supra note 3, at 2, 4-5. Other philosophers
use a wider notion of meaning that includes the illocutionary force of the utterance, as well as
sense and reference. See M. DUMMErr, TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 448-50 (1978); R. HARE,
PRACTICAL INFERENCES 75, 95, 109-10 (1972); Alston, Meaning and Use, in Nv
READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 243, 246-50 (H. Feigl, W. Sellars & K. Lehrer eds. 1972). Whichever concept

of meaning is adopted, "satisfying legal criteria" and "legally binding" are both included in the
meaning of "legally valid" because both notions are part of the fixed sense of "legally valid." See
the dictionary definitions summarized supra note 41. A "sense" is something a sentence has, independent of context and without even being uttered. The "legally binding" notion, like the

"satisfying legal criteria" notion, contributes to the sense of the uttered sentence, regardless of

what the illocutionary force of the utterance is; it signifies being binding from the legal point of
view.
43. THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2, at 181.

44.

Id. at 205.
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the immorality of a rule and the legal invalidity of the rule; these are two
separate issues. 45 Raz and MacCormick accept this thesis and regard it as a
characteristic feature of legal positivism. 46
The Separation Thesis distinguishes the legal point of view from moral points
of view. Legal validity is to be assessed only from the legal point of view, the
viewpoint of judges who accept the rule of recognition as the determinant of
what counts as valid law. If a rule satisfies the rule of recognition criteria, it
should be regarded as legally valid, no matter how immoral it is believed to
be.
It is important to note what the Separation Thesis does not assert. It does
not assert that there is no connection between law and morality, as some critics
have charged.4 7 Hart recognizes a number of important connections. For example, lawmakers use moral ideas in deciding what content legal rules will
have, and judges consider the moral purposes behind the rules they have to
interpret. 48 The Separation Thesis also does not assert that moral standards are
never incorporated into rules of recognition. The Separation Thesis does not
suggest, despite the claims of some critics, that the criteria for validity always
refer to a rule's "pedigree" or manner in which it was adopted, and never to
its content. 49 Hart acknowledges that a rule of recognition might explicitly incorporate moral principles as criteria of validity, and cites the United States
as an example, apparently referring to the United States Constitution. 9 Fur-

Id. at 207. See generally Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
(defending the Separation Thesis against the assertion that rules that violate
fundamental moral principles cannot be valid law).
45.

REV. 593 (1958)
46.

See N. MAcCoRMeK, supra note 2, at 6, 158-59; N. MAcConIICK & 0.

WEINBERGER,

supra note 2, at 128, 129; LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 61-62, 239-40, 258; AUTHORIn' OF
LAw, supra note 2, at 37, 150-51, 158; MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic Law?, 20
VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 7-11, 30 (1985).
The Separation Thesis, or something similar, is often regarded as a defining characteristic of
legal positivism. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 181-82, 253; N. MAcConuscmc & 0.
WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 128; Hart, Legal Positivism, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
418, 419 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). The thesis is prominent in the works of earlier positivists. See J.
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 233-34 (2d ed. 1861); PURE THEORY OF
LAw, supra note 32, at 66-69, 198-205, 217-19; On the Basis of Legal Validity, supra note 32, at 185,
188, 189. See generally Hart, supra note 45, at 594-600 (discussing Bentham and Austin).
47. For apparent suggestions that positivists deny any connection between law and morality,
see P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 37 (1984); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71

HARV.

L. REV. 630, 656-57 (1958).

48. See THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2,
49. Dworkin suggests that the key positivist
for validity relate only to the pedigree of a rule.
attributes to Raz the view that moral standards
constituting criteria of legal validity. See P. SOPER,
the different claim that where the law is unsettled,

at 189-95, 198-202.
tenets include the proposition that the criteria
See R. DwotclN, supra note 1, at 17. Soper
can never be sources of law in the sense of
supra note 47, at 101-02, 102 n.l. Raz makes
the moral notions judges use in developing the

law are not part of the law until expressly incorporated into it. See AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra note

2, at 45-52.
50. See THE CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 2, at 199. Hart suggests that the United States
Constitution contains rule of recognition criteria that impose limitations on what qualifies as legally
valid legislation. See id. at 103.
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thermore, the Separation Thesis does not deny that a judicial decision is a
moral decision for which the judge is morally responsible and owes a moral

justification. ' The Separation Thesis merely asserts that it is not contradictory
for someone to say that Rule A is legally valid and also say that Rule A is
unjust and should not be enforced or obeyed.
This assertion seems unassailable if the positivists' advice is followed and

legal validity is assessed solely from the legal point of view. There is good
reason for following the positivists' advice. In many situations, it is useful to
preserve the distinction between the institutional point of view and our own

moral point of view. This distinction permits us to say that a particular rule
is valid and binding from the institutional legal point of view and yet not
morally justified. The Separation Thesis merely provides this useful distinction.
Critics who attack the Separation Thesis are therefore barking up the wrong

tree. The assault on contemporary positivism should be directed against the
Validity Thesis and the Legal Obligation Thesis.
D.

The Legal Obligation Thesis

The Legal Obligation Thesis asserts that a citizen has a strict legal obligation
to comply with any legally valid rule that requires or forbids specified conduct,
and a judge has a strict legal obligation to apply any legally valid rule that
covers the legal issue being decided. The following discussion focuses on the
second part of this thesis, the clause dealing with the judge's legal obligation.
It will be assumed that a citizen has a legal obligation to comply with a rule
requiring or forbidding conduct if and only if courts have a legal obligation to
apply that rule. Thus, the first part of the thesis stands or falls with the second
part.
MacCormick suggests that as a consequence of appointment to judicial office,
a judge must apply every valid rule of law whenever relevant.5 2 This judicial
duty is properly called a "legal obligation." '5 3 Raz asserts that a legal system
consists of legally valid laws that the courts are bound to apply regardless of
their view of the laws' merits. 54 The courts' obligation to apply valid law is a
"legal obligation." 55
Hart uses the term "legal obligation" to refer to the requirements of legal
rules. 6 With respect to rules of recognition, the most fundamental legal rules,
51.

Detmold suggests that the Separation Thesis denies this. See M.

OF LAW AND MORAL=Tr

DETMOLD,

THE UNITY

21-22, 154 (1984).

52.
53.

LEGAL REASONING, supra note 2, at 54, 57.
See MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 100, 127-28 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
54. AUTHORITY oF LAW, supra note 2, at 113, 148; see J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM 211-12, 214 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYsTEM]; J. RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS 143 (1975) [hereinafter PRACTICAL REASON].
55. See AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 153 (an obligation is a "legal obligation" if it
is an obligation in virtue of a legally valid rule); id. at 96-97 (a court's obligation to apply valid

rules is imposed by a rule of recognition); id. at 150-51 (operative rules of recognition are valid
law).
56.

See THE CONCEPT

OF LAv,

supra note 2, at 166.
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Hart states: "Rules of recognition accepted in the practice of the judges require
them to apply the laws identified by the criteria which they provide . . . . I'
Hart, like MacCormick and Raz, seems to indicate that judges in any legal
system have a legal obligation to apply any relevant rule identified as valid by
the criteria contained in a rule of recognition.
Positivists attach particular meaning to the term "legal obligation." An
"obligation" is a duty or requirement that arises from certain rules58 or
relationships5 9 embedded in social practices. The adjective "legal" indicates the
criteria or point of view relative to which something is obligatory.6, When a
contemporary positivist states that A has a legal obligation to do X, he is making
a hermeneutic statement about what A is obligated to do from the legal point
of view. 6' The legal point of view is the point of view of judges and others
who have committed themselves to rules of recognition and thus to the other
norms of the legal system.6 2 The legal point of view is the institutional point
of view established by the social practices of legal officials.
The most important social practice, of course, is the courts' acceptance and
use of a rule of recognition. According to the positivists, every area of law in
every legal system is governed by a rule of recognition that not only provides
criteria for identifying valid law, but also requires courts to apply legally valid
rules whenever relevant. 63 Since the legal point of view is the point of view of
those who accept this rule of recognition, legally valid rules are binding from
64
the legal point of view.

57.

ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 156; see also id. at 158:
When a judge of an established legal system takes up his office he finds that though
much is left to his discretion there is also a firmly settled practice of adjudication, according
to which any judge of the system is required to apply in the decision of cases the laws
identified by specific criteria or sources. This settled practice is acknowledged as determining
the central duties of the office of a judge and not to follow the practice would be regarded
as a breach of duty ....
58. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 83-85.
59. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 59, 68-69.
60. "Obligatory" is a modal word. See supra note 38.
61. To say that a man has a legal obligation to do a certain act is . . . to assess his
acting or not acting in that way from the point of view adopted by at least the Courts
of the legal system who accept the law as a standard for the guidance and evaluation, of
conduct ...
ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 144; see PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 175-77.
The positivists take a hermeneutic point of view. A hermeneutic statement about legal obligation
uses normative language to assert what is obligatory from the point of view of those who accept
the law; the speaker purports to understand the committed point of view of those who accept the
legal standards, but does not necessarily accept those standards himself. See H. HART, supra note
3, at 14; N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 43; AuTHoRrT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 155-57;
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 54, at 235-38; PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 17677; supra note 3.
62. See ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 144; PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 14243, 171.
63. See ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 156; PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 146.
64. The positivists do not agree that both the notions "satisfying the rule of recognition
criteria" and "binding from the legal point of view" are included in the meaning of "legally
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What is the normative force of the word "binding?" Do the positivists regard
valid rules as being absolutely binding from the legal point of view? In stating
the Legal Obligation Thesis, this article uses the term "strict legal obligation."
Hart, Raz, and MacCormick often seem to suggest that in all legal systems,
courts adopt rules of recognition that make valid primary rules, including valid
case law rules, either absolutely binding, or binding unless exceptions specified
in rules of recognition apply. In this article, the terms "strict legal obligation"
and "strictly binding" are used to refer to the more rigid sense of binding.
Raz asserts that rules of recognition obligate the courts to apply certain
s
laws, "leaving them no choice which laws to apply.''6 Raz suggests that legal
systems, like other institutionalized systems,
norms which the courts are bound to apply regardless of
consist of ...
their view of their merit . .. norms which the [courts] are bound to
apply and are not at liberty to disregard whenever they find their application undesirable, all things considered. ... [Courts] are allowed to
act on 66their own views only to the extent that this is allowed by those
norms.

With respect to valid case law rules, Raz asserts that although some courts
have the power to overrule established precedents, they are permitted to do so
only in certain legally specified situations. No common law court has the power
to discard binding common law rules simply because it seems the best approach
6
under the circumstancesY.
Hart seems to agree with Raz that from the legal point of view, valid rules
are strictly binding. Hart asserts that in any legal system, a firmly settled

valid." &e supra text accompanying note 42. They should, however, acknowledge that the phrase
"primary rules satisfying the rule of recognition criteria," the phrase "legally valid primary rules,"
and the phrase "primary rules binding from the legal point of view" are extensionally equivalent.
All three phrases refer to the same rules. The Validity Thesis asserts that a primary rule is legally
valid if and only if it satisfies the rule of recognition criteria. The positivists also assert that a
primary rule is binding from the legal point of view if and only if it is legally valid. See N.
NIAcCopoiK, supra note 2, at 21 (summarizing Hart's Legal Obligation Thesis).
65. AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 96-97.
66. PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 139; see also AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra note 2, at
113.
67. AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 113-15; see also PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54,
at 140-41. In certain passages, Raz suggests that courts might adopt a rule of recognition with a
very broad exception permitting departure from a valid case law rule if the rule is unjust. See
AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 114; PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 140. The suggestion
seems inconsistent with Raz's statement that courts cannot change valid case law rules "whenever
they consider that on the balance of reasons it would be better to do so." AUTHORITY OF LAw,
supra note 2, at 114; see also PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 140. If courts are free to depart
from any rule they regard as unjust, they are free to depart from a rule if the reasons for departure
outweigh the reasons for adherence. For many judges, such a rule is unjust. Since Raz's basic
position appears to be that courts are not at liberty to disregard legal rules whenever they find
them undesirable, all things considered, see infra note 151, Raz probably meant to suggest that
courts might adopt a rule of recognition permitting departure from a valid case law rule if the
rule is unjust in one or more specified ways. Otherwise, the rule of recognition would not really
limit a court's discretion.
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practice requires judges to apply the laws identified by specific criteria. Hart
also suggests that
judges not only follow this practice as each case arises but are committed
in advance in the sense that they have a settled disposition to do this
without considering the merits of so doing in each case and indeed would
68
regard it not open to them to act on their view of the merits.
Thus, from the judicial point of view, judges are obligated to apply any legally
valid rule without considering the merits of the rule. This interpretation finds
support in other passages in which Hart indicates that although the open texture
of legal rules provides considerable discretion, courts regard themselves as strictly
bound to follow the settled core meaning of these rules.6 9 With respect to case
law rules, Hart claims that a vast number of rules established by the English
70
system of precedent can be altered only by statute.
Although MacCormick seems to equivocate on this issue, 7' he sometimes
indicates that from the judicial and legal points of view, valid rules are strictly
binding on courts. According to MacCormick, there is a fundamental commandment to judges: "Thou shalt not controvert established and binding rules
of law." ' 72 MacCormick suggests that this commandment, which appears to be
absolute and unconditional, applies to case law 'as well as to the other realms
73
of law.
In the passages cited in the three previous paragraphs, the positivists seem
to assert that from the legal point of view, legally valid rules are either absolutely
binding on the courts or binding unless legally specified exceptions apply. This
is merely another way of stating the second part of the Legal Obligation Thesis,
that a judge has a strict legal obligation to apply any legally valid rule that
covers the issue he is deciding. According to the positivists, this obligation is
imposed by a rule of recognition generally accepted by the courts and applies
to case law rules as well as to rules in other realms of law.
E.

Relationships Among the Three Theses

When the Validity Thesis, Separation Thesis, and Legal Obligation Thesis
are considered together, certain relationships among them are apparent. First,
the Separation Thesis presupposes the truth of the Validity Thesis. The Separation Thesis addresses the nature of the criteria of validity contained in rules

68. ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 158-59.
69. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 143 (courts regard legal rules as "standards
to be followed in decision, determinate enough, in spite of their open texture, to limit, though not

to exclude, their discretion," suggesting that when an issue is covered by a legally valid rule,
judicial discretion is afforded only by the open texture of the rule); see also id. at 140 (law is like

a game in which officials are not free to depart from the core of settled meaning in the scoring
rules).

70. Id. at 131-32.
71.

See infra note 151.

72.
73.

LEGAL REASONING, supra

note 2, at 195.

Id. at 214.
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of recognition: criteria of validity need not include moral criteria. If the Validity
Thesis is false, and there are no criteria of validity generally accepted by courts,
there is no place for the Separation Thesis or any other thesis about the nature
of such criteria.
Second, the Legal Obligation Thesis presupposes the truth of the Validity
Thesis. The Legal Obligation Thesis asserts that citizens have a strict legal
obligation to comply with legally valid rules and judges have a strict legal
obligation to apply such rules. If the Validity Thesis is false, and legally valid
rules cannot be identified, the Legal Obligation Thesis has no palpable rules
and cannot yield conclusions about particular legal obligations.
Third, without the Legal Obligation Thesis or some similar thesis concerning
the binding nature of legally valid rules, the Validity Thesis has no practical
significance. Unless legally valid rules are in some sense binding from the legal
point of view, establishing the validity of rules is a futile exercise. The second
and third relationships reflect the dual nature of the concept of legal validity.
For the concept to be useful, there must be criteria of validity, and the status
of validity must have some practical significance.
If the Validity Thesis is disproved, contemporary legal positivism will have
nothing significant and distinctively positivist to say. The Separation Thesis and
Legal Obligation Thesis will have no application, and the positivists will be left
with a Social Sources Thesis and a Discretion Thesis accepted by most nonpositivists. 74 If the Legal Obligation Thesis is disproved and not replaced with
a similar thesis about the binding nature of legally valid rules, the Validity
Thesis and the Separation Thesis will lack practical significance, and positivism
will again be left with a Social Sources Thesis and a Discretion Thesis that
are not distinctively positivist.
II.

THE REALITIES OF AMERICAN CASE LAW

With respect to any legal system, the truth of the Validity Thesis depends
on general acceptance by the courts of some rule of recognition providing conclusive criteria for identifying legally valid rules. The truth of the Legal Obligation Thesis depends on the courts' general acceptance of a rule of recognition
that imposes on judges a strict legal obligation to apply any relevant and legally
valid rule. The next inquiry is whether courts in American jurisdictions have
generally accepted any rules of recognition performing these two functions with
respect to case law.
A.

The Validity Thesis and Doctrines of the -Ratio Decidendi

The Validity Thesis asserts that in every realm of law, including case law,
legally valid rules can usually be distinguished from spurious rules by means
of criteria of validity contained in a rule of recognition accepted by the courts
as a judicial practice. If there is an agreed-upon method for identifying valid
case law rules, it undoubtedly involves extracting these rules from previous

74.

See supra note 2.
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court decisions. There would have to be some generally accepted method for
extracting from a precedent case the ratio decidendi of that case, the reason for
the decision, stated as a legal rule.
American and British commentators have suggested various methods, but
American courts have not generally accepted any of them. As Karl Llewellyn,
the leading American Realist, observed:
[T]here are a number of recognized authoritative relations which prevail
between the rule of law which rests on case-law and the past decisions
on which the rule purports to rest ....

And these recognized and au-

thoritative relations are frequently semi-inconsistent, or wholly inconsistent with one another. Here lies the heart and juice of the matter:
the various established and authoritative relations between the rule and
the cases lead to different rules ...

and our going doctrine ...

about

a rule gives no clear criterion at all about which
how to locate or build
75
rule is The Rule.

Llewellyn's assertion that there is no single generally accepted method for extracting rules from precedent cases is echoed in Martin Golding's statement
' 76
that "there is much debate on how to extract the ratio decidendi from an opinion
and Gidon Gottlieb's observation that "English and American scholars now
agree that the practice of courts with regard to 77the use of the concept of ratio
decidendi is both unprincipled and inconsistent."
Of course, the fact that no single doctrine of ratio decidendi is generally
accepted throughout the United States does not preclude the possibility that in
each state, some doctrine of ratio decidendi has been accepted as a judicial practice. If each state has a generally accepted rule of recognition providing conclusive criteria for identifying valid case law rules, then the Validity Thesis is
true, at least with respect to the United States, even though the criteria for
validity vary from state to state. But it appears that few, if any, states have
a definitive doctrine of ratio decidendi, a generally accepted method capable of
identifying the valid rule to be extracted from a precedent case. If judges in
a particular state had adopted one such method as a judicial practice, presumably judicial opinions would acknowledge such an adoption. But a survey of
judicial opinions in California, Texas, North Carolina, and New York indicates

75.

Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1248 (1938).

76.

M. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 101 (1984).

77. G. Go'rTLEB, supra note 4, at 78. Several British and Australian commentators, including
Hart, have recognized the lack of agreement in common law legal systems as to the proper method
for extracting case law rules from precedent cases. See M. DETMOLD, supra note 51, at 200; LORD
LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M. FREEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1119-20 (5th ed. 1985)
[hereinafter LLOYD's JURISPRUDENCE]; Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 264, 269; Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine
of Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 148, 159, 168 (A. Guest ed. 1961). Detmold
notes that a rule could require the use of rationes decidendi constructed from precedent cases, but
suggests that such a rule is unlikely in the present state of Anglo-American legal thinking. "The
reason for this unlikelihood is that the principles for the construction of ... rationes decidendi
.. are extensively controversial, and controversy is incompatible with rule." M. DETrMOLD, supra
note 51, at 200.
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that none of these states has a generally accepted method capable of isolating
one valid rule from among the many possible rules that could be extracted
from a precedent case. 78
In California opinions, a number of judges state that language found in an
earlier opinion should be understood in light of the facts mentioned in that
opinion. 71 This seems to mean that a general rule stated in an opinion should
not be taken literally, but should be narrowed to apply only to fact patterns
similar to the case for which the opinion was written. The proper extent of
the narrowing process is unclear. One California judge seems to suggest that
the rule cannot be broader than the facts of the precedent case. 8 But this would
yield valid rules inapplicable to subsequent cases, because no two cases present
the same facts. A more useful suggestion is that the rule should be narrowed
so as not to apply to subsequent cases having materially different facts.8 But
this requires some test for distinguishing materially different facts from materially similar facts. California opinions provide no such test. California case law
provides no ratio decidendi doctrine precise enough to identify the valid rule to
be extracted from a precedent case.
In a Texas case, the court stated that the ratio decidendi of a case cannot
82
be determined independently of the facts upon which the decision was based.
There is no indication, however, of any generally accepted practice of how to
use the facts in extracting the ratio decidendi and isolating it from the other rules
that could be derived from these facts. Absent such a practice, there is no
definitive rule of recognition for identifying valid case law rules.
Several North Carolina judicial opinions state that an earlier opinion should
be interpreted in light of the facts of the case for which it was delivered.83 The
opinions also suggest that in analyzing a precedent case, the facts of the case
are more important than the exact language used in the opinion.8 These general
guidelines are not sufficient, however, to isolate one valid rule from among the
many rules that could be extracted from a precedent case. Different rules are
obtained, depending on which facts are focused upon and how they are characterized. The North Carolina opinions suggest a variety of methods for extracting the ratio decidendi, and do not indicate that the courts have adopted any
one particular method. One method identifies, as the ratio decidendi of a precedent

78. See infa notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
79. Ginns v. Savage, 61 Cal. 2d 520, 524 n.2, 393 P.2d 689, 691 n.2, 39 Cal. Rptr. 377,
379 n.2 (1964); Leblanc v. Coverdale, 213 Cal. 654, 660, 3 P.2d 312, 314 (1931); People v. Bank
of San Luis Obispo, 159 Cal. 65, 79, 112 P. 866, 872 (1910); Uhlfelder v. Levy, 9 Cal. 608,
615 (1858); River Farms Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 365, 369, 21 P.2d 643, 645 (1933).
80. River Farms Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 365, 369, 21 P.2d 643, 645 (1933).
81. See Leblanc v. Coverdale, 213 Cal. 654, 660-61, 3 P.2d 312, 314 (1931).
82. Mitchell v. Town of Refugio, 265 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
83. Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 265, 118 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1961); Lane v. Dorney,
250 N.C. 15, 23, 108 S.E.2d 55, 60-61 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d
33 (1960); Woodard v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 195, 72 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1952); Brown v. Hodges,
233 N.C. 617, 618, 65 S.E.2d 144, 144 (1951).
84. Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 265, 118 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1961).
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case, the decision as applied to the particular facts of that case.85 As noted
above, this method would yield rules that are too narrow and specific to serve
as major premises in subsequent cases. Another method infers a general rule
from the specific facts and decisions of a series of precedents.86 Presumably,
the inferred rule captures, in general terms, the important features of the fact
patterns in the precedent cases. A third method identifies, as valid case law
rules, the rules expressly formulated in the opinions and headnotes of precedent
cases, quoting the very words used in those opinions and headnotes. 8 ' Obviously,
each of these methods would produce a different set of valid case law rules.
In a New York opinion, the court stated that a previous decision should
be interpreted in light of the facts stated in the opinion. 88 As noted above, this
general guideline inadequately identifies the valid rule to be extracted from a
precedent. Another New York opinion suggested that an earlier opinion should
be limited to its facts and should not be extended to cases having essentially
different facts."9 The court provided no test for distinguishing between similar
facts and essentially different facts, and the formulation of the valid rule to be
extracted was thus left undetermined. In the same case, the court actually used
another method for extracting rules from precedent cases: the controlling rule
was identified by simply quoting general statements of law contained in earlier
opinions.90 Nothing in New York case law indicates general acceptance of either
of these methods for identifying valid case law rules.
Apparently, the courts in each of the four states surveyed have not generally
accepted any single ratio decidendi doctrine capable of identifying the valid case
law rules to be extracted from previous cases. A closer examination of possible
methods to extract rules from precedents reveals why it is unlikely that any
one of them would isolate valid rules from spurious rules and also be accepted
as the judicial practice in any state.
1. - Constructing a Rule Consistent With the Facts in a Series of Precedents
One possible method for extracting rules from precedent cases is to construct
a rule consistent with the facts and decisions in all previous cases involving the
legal issue to be decided. This method attempts to harmonize a series of precedents by identifying the common fact elements in cases in which a similar
decision was rendered. 9 This method would eliminate any rule that is not
consistent with all precedents involving the legal issue to be resolved. In formulating the valid rule, a particular fact characteristic A would be mentioned
as a necessary condition for legal conclusion T if and only if all precedent cases

85. See Dennis v. City of Albemarle, 243 N.C. 221, 223, 90 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1955).
86. See id. at 225, 90 S.E.2d at 535.
87. See, e.g., Brown v. Hodges, 233 N.C. 617, 618-22, 65 S.E.2d 144, 145-47 (1951).
88. Moriarty v. City of New York, 132 A.D. 10, 12, 116 N.Y.S. 323, 324 (1909), aff'd,
197 N.Y. 544, 91 N.E. 1110 (1910).
89. Crane v. Bennett, 177 N.Y. 106, 112, 69 N.E. 274, 276 (1904).
90. See id. at 113-16, 69 N.E. at 276-77.
91. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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having outcome T exhibited fact characteristic A and all precedent cases failing
to exhibit fact characteristic A had outcome non-T. The various fact characteristics constituting necessary conditions would be regarded as jointly sufficient
conditions for outcome T.
For example, suppose Judge Present must decide whether a particular contractual offer was accepted by silence. Judge Present discovers six earlier cases
dealing with this issue as follows:
CASE
1
2
3
4
5
6

FACT PATTERN
A, B
A, B,
A,
B,
A,
B,

C
C
C
D
C, D

LEGAL
CONCLUSION
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer

Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Not Accepted
Accepted
Not Accepted

Using the method under discussion, Judge Present could construct the rule that
an offer is accepted by silence if and only if facts of type A are present. A is
a necessary condition for acceptance by silence because A was present in all
precedent cases in which the court decided that silence was acceptance, and in
all precedent cases where A was absent, the court decided that silence was not
acceptance. Furthermore, A is the only necessary condition for acceptance by
silence. B is eliminated as a requirement because it was absent in cases 3 and
5, in which silence was determined to be acceptance. C is eliminated as a
requirement because it was absent in cases 1 and 5, in which silence was
acceptance. D is eliminated as a requirement because it was absent in cases 1,
2, and 3, in which silence was acceptance. Similarly, non-B, non-C, and nonD are eliminated as requirements because each was absent in at least one
precedent case in which silence was determined to be acceptance.
This method of extracting rules from previous cases suffers from two major
flaws. First, a judge deciding the present case must assume that all of the material
facts in the precedent cases have been correctly identified. In the above example,
Judge Present must assume that A, B, C, and D are the only fact characteristics
that could possibly be material. Yet it is possible that one or more of the six
previous decisions depended upon the presence or absence of some additional
fact (E, F, or G). Each previous case exhibits many fact characteristics, and
Judge Present could never be certain all material facts were identified.
Second, even assuming the judge has correctly identified all material facts
in the precedent cases, it will usually be possible to construct more than one
rule consistent with the previous decisions. In the above example, two different
rules are consistent with the six precedents. The first rule was discussed above.
The second rule is that an offer is accepted by silence if and only if facts of
type A are present and facts of type B, type C, or type D are also present.
Even when there is only one material fact characteristic common to all previous
cases decided the same way, if each case contains other material facts, it is
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possible to add a disjunctive requirement, such as "B or C or D," referring
to the other material fact characteristics present in those cases. When there are
two or more material fact characteristics that were present in all precedents
decided the same way, more than two rules can be constructed." When a judge
can construct two or more rules consistent with all the precedents, which rule
is regarded as the valid rule? The method under discussion merely eliminates
rules inconsistent with one or more precedents and does not enable the judge
to choose among rules consistent with all precedents. Because of the two problems mentioned above, the method under discussion fails to identify the valid
rule to be extracted from a series of precedent cases and thus fails to isolate
valid case law rules from spurious rules.
2.

Constructing a Rule From the Material Facts of a Single Precedent

Some commentators have suggested that a judge can decide a case by applying a rule constructed from the material facts of a single precedent. 3 This
method of extracting rules from earlier cases poses problems similar to those
presented by the method discussed previously.
First, various rules can be extracted from a given precedent, depending on
which facts are deemed to be material. A.L. Goodhart suggests that the material
facts are the facts regarded as material by the judge who decided the precedent
case. If that judge treated facts B and C as material and reached legal conclusion
T, the rule is that in any case with facts B and C, the court must reach
conclusion T.9 4 But the opinion in the precedent case usually fails to distinguish between material and immaterial facts. How does one ascertain that the judge regarded
only facts B and C as material, and not fact A? Goodhart asserts that all facts

92. In the above example, suppose that fact characteristic B had been present in all six
precedents.

LEGAL
CASE

1
2
3
4
5
6

FACT PATTERN
A,
A,
A,
A,

B
B,
B,
B,
B,
B,

C
C
C
C,

D
D

CONCLUSION
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer
Offer

Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Not Accepted
Accepted
Not Accepted

Three different rules would be consistent with the precedents: (1) an offer is accepted by silence
if and only if facts of type A are present; (2) an offer is accepted by silence if and only if facts

of type A and facts of type B are present; and (3) an offer is accepted by silence if and only if
facts of type A are present and facts of type B or type C or type D are also present.
93. See E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEOAL REASONIN 1-3 (1948) (basic pattern of legal
reasoning is reasoning by example). See generally Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,
40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930) (prescribing method for finding rules in precedent cases). Judges often
suggest that in extracting the ratio decidendi from a precedent case, one should focus on the facts
of that case. See supra notes 84, 88 & 89 and accompanying text.
94. See Goodhart, supra note 93, at 173, 179.
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set forth in the opinion must be considered material except those immaterial
on their face. Unless a fact is expressly or impliedly held to be immaterial, it
must be considered material.95 But substantial doubt may exist as to whether
some facts were impliedly held to be immaterial. So long as there is doubt
about the material facts, there will be doubt about the rule to be extracted
from the precedent case. 96
The second problem is that even if there were some determinative method
for identifying the material facts in the precedent case, there would still be a
number of rules that could be extracted from that precedent. As Julius Stone
observes, "each [fact] is usually . .. capable of being stated at various levels
of generality, all of which embrace 'the fact' in question in the precedent
decision, but each of which may yield a different result in the different factsituation of a later case." ' 97 For example, if the agent of harm in the earlier
case was a dead snail, how is this fact to be stated in the rule derived from
that case? A dead snail? A snail? A noxious tangible foreign body? A noxious
foreign element? A noxious element? 98 Each level of generality produces a different rule.9 9 "[T]he reach of the [rule], even after each 'material fact' seen
by the original court is identified, will vary with the level of generalization at
which 'the fact' is stated. How then is the 'correct' level of statement of Fact
A ,to be ascertained by the later court?"' 10 0 No one has provided a satisfactory
answer to this question." 1
Because of these problems in identifying the material facts and establishing
the level of generality at which a material fact should be stated, the method
under discussion fails to isolate one rule as the ratio decidendi of a precedent
case. It does not provide a determinative method for distinguishing the valid
rule from spurious rules.

95. Id. at 178.
96. Levi suggests that a judge deciding a present case uses personal judgment in identifying
the material facts in an earlier case: "[Tlhe judge in the present case may find irrelevant the
existence or absence of facts which prior judges thought important" E. Levi, supra note 93, at 2.
This implies that the judge in the present case can effectively choose among a number of possible
rules by making up a personal list of the material facts in the earlier case; thus an objectively
determinative method does not exist for identifying the valid rule to be extracted from a precedent
case.
97. Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REv. 597, 603 (1959).
98. Id. (referring to Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (Scot.)); see also K. LLEVELLYN, THE BsA4n0BLE BusH 48 (1951 ed.) (discussing similar problem involving Buick motor car
and concluding that no one case gives any guidance).
99. If three material facts exist, and fact A can be stated at five different levels of generality,
fact B at three different levels, and fact C at four different levels, then 60 different rules can be
formulated based on these facts.
100. Stone, supra note 97, at 606; see also Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Phijwdizienrecht in Amerika, 33 CoLuM. L. Ray. 199, 205-09 (1933) (noting the same problem).
101. Hart notes that some theories assert that the rule for which a precedent is authority is

the rule that a later court would select from the logically possible alternatives after weighing moral
and social factors. Hart, supra note 77, at 269. This approach gives a later court discretion to

choose the rule it considers best on moral grounds and thus fails to provide an objective and
determinative method for identifying the ratio decidendi of a precedent.
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Recognizing Rules Formulated in Judicial Opinions

A third method of extracting case law rules from previous cases recognizes
2
as valid the rules explicitly formulated in judicial opinions."0 American judges
frequently quote case law rules expressly set forth in earlier opinions and then
apply these rules in deciding cases.' 0 3 Of course, many opinions contain no
explicitly stated rule that could serve as the major premise for the court's
decision on a particular issue. Under this third method, a case involving such
an opinion may be regarded as a case that yields no valid rule on that particular
issue. Instead of trying to construct rules from the material facts of one or
more precedent cases, judges would recognize as valid case law only those rules
enunciated in judicial opinions. 104
This seems to be a determinative method of identifying valid case law rules.
Judges deciding a present case need not worry about any distinction between
material facts and immaterial facts. So long as the rule formulated in an earlier
opinion is one from which the decision in that case could be derived, and so
long as the rule disposes of the issue to be decided, judges apply it as a valid
rule. Assuming the earlier opinion explicitly formulated the rule in only one
form, judges do not have to choose among a number of possible rules. If judges
find that their own court or a higher court has, on separate occasions, formulated two or more conflicting rules dealing with the same issue, they could
regard as valid the rule formulated in the most recent opinion.
American courts, however, have not generally accepted this third method.
Indeed, it is unlikely this third method has been adopted as the official doctrine
of the ratio decidendi in any American state. 05 Many judges would agree with
Edward Levi that an explicit rule formulation in an earlier opinion is not

102. See G. GOTTLIEB, supra note 4, at 81, 82, 85-86; LLOYD'S JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 77,
at 1115; R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 35-36 (1961); see also supra notes 87 & 90 and
accompanying text.
To qualify as a valid rule under this method, a rule formulated in an earlier opinion must be
one from which the decision in that case could have been derived; mere dicta would not count
as valid case law rules.
103. For examples in the law of contracts, see National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States,
338 F.2d 99, 108 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); Elsinore Union Elementary
School Dist. v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 386, 353 P.2d 713, 717, 6 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1960);
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 271 (1859); Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 259-60, 366 A.2d
162, 165 (1976).
104. This method has some advantages. The judge who wrote the opinion in an earlier case
may have justified the decision by means of a norm whose scope is barely wider than the facts
of that case, and may have been unwilling to commit to any rule having sufficient scope to be
useful in deciding future cases. In writing the opinion, the judge may therefore have refrained
from prescribing any general rule. Alternatively, the judge who wrote the earlier opinion may have
refrained from enunciating a general rule because no rule was used in justifying the decision.
Perhaps mere intuition led to the conclusion that the reasons for deciding in favor of one party
outweighed the reasons for deciding in favor of the other party. Whatever the reason for the
abstention, it seems inappropriate for a court deciding a subsequent case to insist on extracting a
rule from the earlier case when no rule was intended by the author of the opinion in that earlier
case.
105. See supra notes 79, 84 & 89 and accompanying text.
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controlling law, but mere dictum. 1 6 This reluctance to recognize the explicitly
formulated rule as the valid rule is probably due in large part to the notion
that a court should merely decide the case before it and not legislate for future
cases by means of broad rules. 10 7 The typical judge wants some leeway in
extracting case law rules from previous cases. The judge wants to be able to
select, from a number of possible rules, the most appropriate rule for the case
at bar. Possibly, the more a ratio decidendi doctrine satisfies the quest for a
determinative method of identifying valid case law rules, the less likely American
courts will accept the doctrine as part of a rule of recognition.
One may conclude that the Validity Thesis has been disproved by the realities of American case law. The Validity Thesis asserts that in every realm of
law, including case law, valid rules can usually be distinguished from spurious
rules by means of criteria contained in a rule of recognition generally accepted
by the courts. The survey of case law in four American states indicates, however, that none of these states has a generally accepted rule of recognition
capable of identifying the valid rule among the many rules that could be extracted from precedent cases. Furthermore, the examination of various methods
for extracting rules from precedent cases suggests that it is unlikely any state
has a rule of recognition that isolates valid case law rules. Each method either
fails to isolate valid rules or is unlikely to be generally accepted as a judicial
practice.""0
B.

The Legal Obligation Thesis and Doctrines of Stare Decisis

The positivists' Legal Obligation Thesis asserts that a judge has a strict
legal obligation to apply any legally valid rule that covers the issue being decided. Valid rules, including valid case law rules, are strictly binding from the
legal point of view, the point of view of judges who accept the legal system's
rules of recognition. The positivists claim that judges regard valid rules as either
absolutely binding or binding unless specific exceptions apply, and this article
designates "strict legal obligation" and "strictly binding" as terms of art to
convey this rigid sense of bindingness.
The evidence indicates that even if valid case law rules are identified, our
appellate courts do not generally regard them as being strictly binding. American
judges have not accepted as a judicial practice any doctrine of stare decisis that
makes a valid case law rule strictly binding on the court that developed the
rule. American judges have not generally accepted any rule of recognition that
makes valid case law rules absolutely binding or binding unless specified exceptions apply.
In his survey of American appellate opinions, Llewellyn noted a number of
different techniques for dealing with precedent. Many of these involve altering

106. E. Lzvi, supra note 93, at 2.
107. See, e.g., Bingham, What Is the Law? (pt. 1), 11 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1912); Levi, The
Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 395, 403-06 (1965).
108. Absent a rule of recognition, although some case law rules are more likely to be used
than others, case law rules are neither legally valid nor legally invalid.
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or discarding pre-existing case law rules.' 0 9 According to Llewellyn, this multiplicity of techniques
disposes of all question of "control" or dictation by precedent .... [T]o
the judge or court each individual precedent technique speaks thus: As
you search for the right rule of law to govern the case in hand, I am
one of the things which, respectably, honorably, and in full accordance
with the common law tradition as inherited and as currently practiced
among your brethren of the high bench - I am one of the things you
are formally entitled in and by your office to do to and with any prior
relevant judicial language or holding as it comes before you. 110
There are indeed a number of respected techniques for dealing with precedent, and most of them do not treat pre-existing case law rules as absolutely
binding. According to one court, "We act in the finest common-law tradition
when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice ...
we abdicate our own function ... when we refuse to reconsider an old and
unsatisfactory court-made rule."'' Max Radin observed that in America, overruling of precedent is rare, but occurs more often than following a decision
that goes against the court's notion of right and wrong." 2 Of course, most
decisions are consistent with precedent. Judges tend to share common notions
of the requirements of justice, and would render similar decisions even if no
one had suggested that precedent is binding. Radin asserts that when an absolute
rule of stare decisis would be significant, i.e., when a court is tempted to reject
precedent on moral grounds, such a "rule" is broken more often than followed.
Moreover, judges generally do not adhere to a doctrine of stare decisis that
makes case law rules binding unless some exception specifically enumerated in
a rule of recognition permits deviation. The more prevalent view is that a court
is free to depart from an established rule of case law whenever it determines
that all things considered, this would be the best thing to do. Courts are free
to consider any reasons based on sincerely-held notions of justice. Chief Justice
Robert von Moschzisker of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described this
flexible notion of stare decisis:
[A]t times, prior decisions conceived to be wrong must be departed from
... . [If the controlling authorities cannot really be distinguished] and
the court is convinced, practically beyond a reasonable doubt, that they

109.

See K.

LLEWELLYN, THE

COMMON LAW TRADITION 75-91 (1960).

110. Id. at 76.
111. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951); accord Haney v. City
of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964); Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 328

Mass. 341, 345-47, 103 N.E.2d 692, 694-95 (1952); Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Or. 412, 414-15, 384 P.2d 1009, 1010-11 (1963) (it is inconsistent with the
common-law tradition to wait upon the legislature to correct an outmoded rule of case law; rejects

the contention that stare decisis binds courts absolutely to the past). Several commentators have
observed that American courts do not generally regard existing case law rules as absolutely binding.
See, e.g., L. CARTER, REASON IN LAw 185 (2d ed. 1984); R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH L ,v
17 (3d ed. 1977); M. GOLDINO, supra note 76, at 99; 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 186, at 522 (1965).
112. Radin, supra note 100, at 204.
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were wrongly decided and the ends of justice require their overruling,
[Tihe proper American conception
it should depart from them . ...
comprehends stare decisis as a flexible doctrine, under which the degree
of control to be allowed a prior judicial determination depends largely
on the nature of the question at issue, the circumstances attending its
decision, and, perhaps, somewhat on the attitude of individual participating judges. 113
1 4
Various commentators have noted similar judicial attitudes.
As Llewellyn observed, no single rule can be regarded as the American rule
of stare decisis. However, two notions have gained considerable support. According to the first notion, an established case law rule should be followed
unless the injustice of the rule exceeds the undesirable consequences of changing
the rule; for example, harming the interests of persons who have relied on the
established rule." ' According to the second notion, a pre-existing case law rule
is a mere guideline to be used only when a court finds that it provides sound
guidance." 6 Neither of these views regards case law rules as strictly binding.
The fact that American courts do not generally regard case law rules as
strictly binding does not preclude the possibility that in each state, the courts
have generally accepted some doctrine of stare decisis. Perhaps the Legal Obligation Thesis merely misdescribes the rules of recognition adopted in the var-

113. von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409, 411, 412,
414-15 (1924).
114. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (1973) (American judges have always
assumed power to overrule an earlier case if they considered it egregiously wrong); Bingham, supra
note 107, at 16 (courts follow precedents for reasons which do not include an authority in courts
to dictate even within limits the disposal of future litigation); Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis,
21 WAYNE L. REv. 1043, 1045, 1046 (1975) (American appellate courts have usually felt free to
depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so). Hughes suggests that distinctions
between valid rules and invalid rules help little in analyzing judicial decisions and that arguments
about justice are regarded as acceptable reasons for decisions, whether or not they are based on
valid rules. See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 430-31, 433 (1968).
Many judges recognize that justice has a tacit dimension that cannot be reduced to rules. Such
judges are unwilling to regard case law rules as absolutely binding or to accept any rule of recognition that purports to specify an exclusive list of situations in which pre-existing case law rules
may be departed from.
115. See, e.g., Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 25, 76 A.2d 877, 883-84 (1950) (Vanderbilt, C.J.,
dissenting); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICAL PRoCEss 112-13, 149-52 (1921); R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 102, at 171; von Moschzisker, supra note 113, at 413-14.
This approach presumes that an established rule should be followed; this presumption can be
overcome, however, in a utilitarian balancing of social consequences. This approach exemplifies
the second of the four uses of norms mentioned supra note 4.
116. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 109, at 179 (rules are not to control, but to guide
decision; the influence of a case law rule depends upon its wisdom and not its status as a rule of
law); R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 59 (1922) (courts largely use the
rules of law as a general guide, wrenching the law no more than necessary to render a judgment
according to the equities of the case); Corbin, Sixty-eight Years at Law, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 183,
188 (1964) (if well-constructed, rules constructed from appellate opinions can be useful guides for
courts).
This approach does not even presume that any pre-existing case law rule should be followed.
This approach corresponds to the fourth of the four uses of norms mentioned supra note 4.
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ious states. Although few, if any, states have a rule of recognition making valid
case law rules strictly binding, is it not possible that courts in each state have
generally accepted a rule of recognition that accords some kind of binding status
to valid case law rules? The evidence, however, suggests this is unlikely. One
would expect judicial opinions to reflect such a rule. The survey of judicial opinions
in California, Texas, North Carolina, and New York indicates that none of these
states has a rule of recognition making valid case law rules strictly binding, and
that none of these states have any rule of recognition that concerns the binding
status of case law rules. A generally accepted doctrine of stare decisis does not
exist in any of these states.
In the California opinions, 1 7 a number of statements indicate that the judiciary has not generally regarded case law precedent as strictly binding. The
8
California opinions suggest that previous decisions are not absolutely binding,"
119
and that previous decisions
that following precedent is a matter of discretion,
120
provide only persuasive authority.
No single doctrine of stare decisis seems to have gained general acceptance
among the California judges. The opinions express a number of different doctrines:
2
(1) an established rule is inviolable, even if erroneous;' '
(2) a court should adhere to precedent unless the disadvantages of doing so
22
greatly outweigh the advantages;'
(3) a previous ruling should not be upset unless it is clearly erroneous and
adhering to the ruling would produce more evil than overruling it; 123
24
(4) an earlier decision is presumed to be correct;
(5) a previous decision should not be followed if error would be perpetuated
and wrong would result; 125 and
126
(6) crude decisions should be revised without reluctance.
This variety of judicial expression indicates that California judges have not

117. The California cases cited infta notes 118-26 include not only case law cases, but also
cases involving statutory or constitutional construction where the opinions express views about
precedent that apparently apply to case law precedent as well as precedent in the realms of statutory
or constitutional construction.
118. Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646, 668 (1874).
119. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 679, 312 P.2d 680, 684-85 (1957); Hart
v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 607 (1860); Welch v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 165, 189 (1857).
120. Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 208, 58 P. 460, 462 (1899).
121. Santa Cruz Portland Cement Co. v. County of Santa Clara, 191 Cal. 578, 578-79, 217
P. 520, 520 (1923); Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn, 121 Cal. 379, 382, 53 P. 813, 814 (1898); Hart
v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 619-20 (1860) (Cope, J., dissenting); Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 282,
291-92 (1858); Darsie v. Darsie, 49 Cal. App. 2d 491, 495, 122 P.2d 64, 66 (1942).
122. Welch v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 165, 200-01 (1857).
123. Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 209, 58 P. 460, 462 (1899); Houghton v. Austin,
47 Cal. 646, 667 (1874); Wright v. Carillo, 22 Cal. 595, 604-05 (1863); Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal.
530, 600-01 (1860).
124. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 601 (1860).
125. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 679, 312 P.2d 680, 685 (1957).
126.

Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646, 667 (1874) (quoting Kent).
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generally accepted as part of a rule of recognition any single doctrine concerning
the binding status of pre-existing case law rules.
In the Texas opinions, various judicial statements suggest that established
rules of case law are not strictly binding. Such rules are not generally regarded
as being absolutely binding. One judge opined that courts may depart from
the rules whenever this is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. 127 Another
judge stated that a court may depart from a prior ruling when there are cogent
reasons for doing so. 128 No particular ends of justice and no particular cogent
reasons are specified in these opinions. Similarly, a number of opinions indicate
that case law rules establishing property rights may be altered only in unusual
circumstances, but do not specify the circumstances.1 2 9 Thus, it appears that
the Texas courts have not adopted any rule of recognition enumerating the
specific circumstances in which courts are free to reject pre-existing rules of
case law.
Indeed, Texas courts have not generally accepted any single rule of recognition that deals with the binding status of case law rules. Some opinions
can be interpreted as indicating that case law precedent is always binding without exception.1 30 Another opinion suggested that courts may alter the rules
whenever it is necessary to make the rules conform to the prevailing customs
and precepts of the legal profession and the community.' 3 Yet another opinion
expressed the familiar doctrine that courts are free to depart from precedent
whenever cogent reasons exist and the general welfare will suffer less from such
a departure than from a strict adherence to precedent. 132 Finally, another opinion
33
asserted that a court may depart from case law rules whenever justice requires.
If the Texas courts have generally accepted any single doctrine of stare decisis,
it is not reflected in their judicial opinions.
Members of the North Car6lina Supreme Court have not generally treated
established rules of case law as strictly binding. The court has stated that
previous decisions affecting vital interests should not be disturbed except for
the most cogent reasons.13 4 This suggests that pre-existing case law rules are
not absolutely binding. Nor is there any enumeration of the cogent reasons
that justify departure from previous rulings. Apparently, the North Carolina
justices have not adopted any rule of recognition containing specific exceptions
to a general duty to adhere to valid case law rules. In fact, broad discretion

127.

Brokaw v. Collett, 230 S.W. 790, 791-92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).

128. Benavides v. Garcia, 290 S.W. 739, 740 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).
129. See Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 328, 249 S.W.2d
914, 916 (1952); Tanton v. State Nat'l Bank, 125 Tex. 16, 18-19, 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1935);
Mitchell v. Town of Refugio, 265 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
130. See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964); Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v.
Hightower, 140 Tex. 200, 205, 166 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (1942).
131. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. 1975).
132. Benavides v. Garcia, 290 S.W. 739, 740 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).

133. Brokaw v. Collett, 230 S.W. 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
134. Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 253 N.C. 112, 117-18, 116 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1960);
Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 391, 75 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1953), overruled on
other grounds, Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
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to abandon earlier rulings is suggested in Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital,

Inc. 13 In Rabon, the majority indicates that the court abandons pre-existing rules
whenever their application would result in injustice.
The various opinions in Rabon dispel any notion that the North Carolina
judiciary has generally accepted one particular doctrine of stare decisis. As
noted, the majority opinion indicates that a rule may be abandoned whenever
it works injustice. One dissenting opinion, however, suggests that an established
case law rule should be changed only by the legislature. 3 6 Another dissenting
opinion asserts that an earlier decision may be overruled, but only if it was
erroneous when made,137 which precludes overruling antiquated case law rules
because of changed social conditions. Rabon thus presents three very different
doctrines of stare decisis.
The New York opinions indicate that pre-existing case law rules are neither
absolutely binding nor binding unless some specific rule of recognition exception
applies. 38 Some opinions suggest that a court may depart from its prior rulings
if there are compelling circumstances or cogent reasons; 39 however, the circumstances or reasons that would justify departure are not specified. Other
opinions indicate that case law rules may be discarded whenever justice requires.' 4° It is difficult to imagine a less specific exception or one that affords
more discretion. New York judges apparently have not generally regarded case
law rules as strictly binding.
The New York judiciary has not adopted any single doctrine of stare decisis
for case law. The opinions reveal a number of different doctrines:
(1) a court should not depart from its previous rulings except when there
are compelling circumstances or most cogent reasons;' 4'
(2) a court may depart from precedent whenever the need for predictability
is outweighed by the need for a more just rule; 142 and

135. 269 N.C. 1, 20, 152 S.E.2d 485, 498 (1967). The opinion notes, however, that in matters
involving title to property, changes in the law are left to the legislature. Id., 152 S.E.2d at 498.
136. Id. at 23, 152 S.E.2d at 503 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 29, 152 S.E.2d at 502 (Lake, J., dissenting). A third dissenting judge filed no
opinion. Four judges joined the majority. Even assuming that all four members of the majority
shared the same doctrine of stare decisis, acceptance by four of seven judges is not "general
acceptance. "
138. The New York cases cited infra notes 139-43 include some statutory construction cases
wherein the court pronounces a doctrine of stare decisis explicitly or impliedly applicable to case

law.
139. See Cenven, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 842, 843, 362 N.E.2d 251, 252,
393 N.Y.S.2d 700, 700 (1977); In re Estate of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 498-99, 348 N.E.2d 905,
908, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1976).
140. See Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957);
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 402 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).
141. See Cenven, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 842, 843, 362 N.E.2d 251, 252,
393 N.Y.S.2d 700, 700 (1977); In re Estate of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 498-99, 348 N.E.2d 905,
908, 384 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1976).
142. See Higby v. Mahoney, 48 N.Y.2d 15, 21-22, 396 N.E.2d 183, 186, 187, 421 N.Y.S.2d
35, 38, 39 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); id. at 25, 396 N.E.2d at 188, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 41
(Meyer, J., dissenting); In re Estate of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 348 N.E.2d 905, 908, 384
N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1976).
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(3) regardless of the need for predictability, a rule should be discarded if
it is contrary to concepts of justice or contrary to reason.
Although these doctrines overlap to a considerable extent, they are not equivalent, and one may conclude that New York's judges have not generally accepted any particular rule of recognition component concerning the binding
status of valid case law rules.
The Legal Obligation Thesis asserts that valid case law rules are strictly
binding from the legal point of view. The survey of judicial opinions in four
states indicates, however, that judges in none of these states generally regard
case law rules as strictly binding. The survey also indicates that in none of
these states have the judges generally accepted any single doctrine of stare
decisis. If these four states are typical, few, if any, American states have a rule
of recognition making valid case law rules strictly binding on appellate courts.
Furthermore, few, if any, states have a rule of recognition assigning any particular kind of binding status to valid case law rules. The Legal Obligation
Thesis does not merely misdescribe the binding status assigned to valid case
law rules by rules of recognition; in most American states, no rule of recognition
even deals with this status.
C.

Legal Systems and Social Practices

The absence of a rule of recognition governing either the identification of
valid case law rules or their binding status disproves both the Validity Thesis
and the Legal Obligation Thesis, and thereby impairs the positivists' model of
a legal system of rules. In this model, legal systems include case law, and
are actually systematic. They owe their systematic nature to rules of recognition
that perform two functions. First, rules of recognition determine which primary
rules are valid members of the normative system. Second, rules of recognition
determine when application of these valid rules is required in the resolution of
legal issues. Judicial acceptance of the rules of recognition thus makes selection
of primary rules a truly systematic process.
Although this model fits American statutory law rather well, it does not
accurately depict American case law2.l4 The evidence indicates that few, if any,
states have a generally accepted rule of recognition that effectively identifies
valid case law rules and determines their binding status. Absent such a rule
of recognition, case law is not part of a normative system. It is normative, but
not systematic.1 4 A more accurate model would depict case law as an evolving

143. See In re Estate of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 498-99, 348 N.E.2d 905, 908, 384 N.Y.S.2d
429, 431-32 (1976); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11
(1957); In re Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 466, 18 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1939).
144. See L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 114 (1968).
145. Simpson's remarks about common law apply to American case law:
How then are we to view the positivists' notion of the common law as a body of rules,
forming a system in that the rules satisfy tests of validity? We must start by recognizing
what common sense suggests, which is that the common law is more like a muddle than
a system, and that it would be difficult to conceive of a less systematic body of law. The
systemization of the common law - its reduction to a code of rules which satisfy accepted
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body of guiding ideas, some of which have been accepted as judicial custom,
while others are upstart innovations struggling for wider recognition. The ideas
accepted as custom enjoy this status because judges have agreed that they are
46
good ideas, and not because they satisfy some mediating rule of recognition.
To understand why the positivists' model breaks down in the realm of case
law, it must be noted how that this model makes the existence and scope of
a legal system dependent upon actual social practices. The existence and scope
of legal systems depend upon the existence and content of rules of recognition.
The existence and content of rules of recognition depend upon what judges
actually accept as a social practice. 147 The assertion that a given rule of recognition exists is thus an empirical assertion subject to empirical falsification.
The Validity Thesis and Legal Obligation Thesis are empirical hypotheses concerning the existence and content of rules of recognition in all legal systems of
rules. Both theses have been disproved because judges in many American states
have not accepted, as a social practice, any rule of recognition that effectively
identifies valid case law rules or makes them strictly binding. The Validity
Thesis and Legal Obligation Thesis must be rejected because they are defective
148
as descriptive sociology.

tests provided by other rules - is surely a programme, or an ideal, and not a description
of the status quo.
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES)
77, 99 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
146.

For the notion that case law (in common law countries in general) is best viewed as a

body of customary norms, each of which is accepted by courts for reasons independent of any rule
of recognition, see Simmonds, Legal Validity and Decided Cases, 1 LEGAL STUD. 24, 34-36 (1981);
Simpson, supra note 145, at 91-99.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 17 & 22.
148. A dilemma confronted the contemporary positivists in constructing their theory of law.
They could either base their concepts of legal validity and legal obligation on a priori notions of
law or morality (in which case, these concepts would often not reflect the legal point of view
prevailing within actual legal institutions), or they could base their concepts of legal validity and
legal obligation on the actual social practices of courts (in which case, these concepts would be
vulnerable to empirical falsification). In choosing the latter approach, the positivists have followed
Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, the existence and material content of a rule depend upon an actual
practice, a customary use of the rule (a matter of empirical fact). See L. WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (pt. 1) 6§ 190, 198, 202 (3d ed. G. Anscombe trans. 1958); see also G.
BAKER & P. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY 102, 150 (1985) (summarizing
Wittgenstein) [hereinafter G. BAKER & P. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN]. The key concept in Wittgenstein's notion of a rule-following practice is normative regularity, a regular pattern of behavior in
which a rule is used as a guiding norm. See id. at 138, 151, 153, 155-56, 162. In the case of a
social rule, the existence and content of the rule obviously depend on an agreed-upon social practice.
See L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra, at §§ 241, 242 (concerning language rules); see also G. BAKER & P.
HACKER, SKEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE 21 (1984); G. BAKER & P. HACKER, WIrGENSTEN,
supra, at 243-44, 249-50; 0. McGINN, WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING 53-56 (1984). Hart's notion of
a social rule closely resembles Wittgenstein's; for Hart, a social rule is contingent upon a social
group's behavioral conformity to the rule and acceptance of the rule as a social norm (i.e., normative
regularity). See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 2, at 54-56. Accordingly, a particular rule of
recognition exists as a social rule only if it is actually accepted by courts as a norm in a regular
judicial practice. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Since the contemporary positivists'
Validity Thesis and Legal Obligation Thesis rest upon the premise that certain rules of recognition
exist as social rules, these theses are vulnerable to empirical falsification.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/3

30

Mather: Legal Positivism and American Case Law
LEGAL POSITIVISM

1986]

III.

645

THE PROSPECTS FOR CONFORMITY

Can the Validity Thesis and the Legal Obligation Thesis be modified so as
to conform to the realities of American case law? If the contemporary positivists
can make such modifications without sacrificing the essential features of their
model of legal rules, an obituary for legal positivism may be premature.
A.

Modifying the Validity Thesis

The Validity Thesis asserts that by applying criteria contained in a rule of
recognition generally accepted by the courts, one can usually ascertain whether
a primary rule is legally valid. This thesis has been disproved. In many American states, judges have not generally accepted any rule of recognition that
effectively identifies valid case law rules. The contemporary positivists could
acknowledge this and modify their Validity Thesis so that it does not apply to
case law, but only to constitutional, statutory, and administrative law. So modified, the thesis would seem to conform to American judicial practices.
It is unlikely, however, that the positivists would be willing to make this
modification. It would entail conceding that their model of legal rules does not
fit all the realms of law in which rules are used. The positivists' only model
of legal rules is a model of a legal system, and for the positivists, a legal system
exists only to the extent that there is a rule of recognition providing authoritative
criteria of legal validity. If the positivists accept the proposed modification and
acknowledge that some states do not have rules of recognition containing authoritative criteria of validity for case law rules, then the positivists must concede
that case law rules are not included in the legal systems of those states. The
positivist model of legal rules, a model of a system of rules, would then fail
to account for the many rule-based judicial decisions that are rendered in the
realm of case law. It is unlikely that the positivists would accept any modification
of the Validity Thesis that puts case law beyond the reach of their only model
of legal rules. It is difficult to conceive of any other viable modification, and
149
one may conclude that the Validity Thesis is doomed.
B.

Modifying the Legal Obligation Thesis

The Legal Obligation Thesis asserts that a judge has a strict legal obligation
to apply any legally valid rule that covers the legal issue being decided. From
the legal point of view, the point of view of judges who accept the rules of
recognition, legally valid rules are strictly binding. This thesis has been disproved. Even if it is assumed that valid case law rules can be identified, judges
in many American states have not generally accepted any rule of recognition
that makes such rules strictly binding. Although there are a number of ways
in which the contemporary positivists might modify their Legal Obligation Thesis, none seems viable.

149.

A realistic theory of law would recognize that case law is law but is unsystematic, and

that case law rules are neither legally valid nor legally invalid. See supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
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First, contemporary positivists could modify the Legal Obligation Thesis to
assert that case law rules established by superior courts are, from the legal
point of view, strictly binding on inferior courts but not on the superior courts
that established the rules. Assuming that judges indeed generally regard such
rules as being strictly binding on inferior courts, this modified thesis would
comport with the realities of American case law. However, it is unlikely that
positivists would accept this modification. The modified thesis implies that in
each state, there is a rule of recognition making certain case law rules strictly
binding on inferior courts, but no rule of recognition concerning the binding
status of case law rules in the highest court. If the highest court accepts no

such rule of recognition as binding upon itself, then the highest court is legally
free to discard established case law rules whenever it desires. Thus, case law
is not part of that state's legal system of rules,' 50 and is therefore beyond the
scope of the positivists' model of legal rules.

Second, the positivists might acknowledge that courts do not generally regard
case law rules as being strictly binding, and modify their Legal Obligation
Thesis to assert merely that in each state the courts have generally accepted
some rule of recognition concerning the binding status of valid case law rules
in all courts of that state. Such a rule of recognition need not provide that
case law rules are strictly binding. In some states, the rule might provide that
a valid case law rule is prima facie binding and must be applied unless the
reasons for rejecting the rule, whatever they may be, outweigh the reasons for
applying the rule. Even if the positivists could reconcile this modified thesis
with their model of legal rules,'-" it must be rejected because it is not consistent
with the realities of American case law. The preceding survey of judicial opinions in four states indicated that the courts in each state have not generally

150. In the positivists' model, a legal system of rules exists only to the extent that a generally
accepted rule of recognition identifies valid rules and attributes binding status to such rules. Se
supra text accompanying notes 18, 54, 57 & 63; supra § II.C. If no such rule of recognition
concerning case law is accepted by the highest court as binding upon itself, there is no generally
accepted rule of recognition making case law systematic. If inferior courts must follow case law rules
provided by the highest court, while that highest court is free to disregard those rules whenever
it wants to, the realm of case law is governed by arbitrary authority and not by a legal system.
151. In certain passages, MacCormick suggests that courts might regard case law rules as
merely prima facie binding. See LEGAL R.ASOINo, supra note 2, at 215-16, 227, 243. Raz, however,
would presumably reject the proposed modification as incompatible with his concept of a legal
system and his concept of a legal rule. In Raz's legal system, no rule of recognition can make
valid primary rules less than strictly binding. From the legal point of view, a legal system consists
of norms that are not merely prima facie binding; they are strictly binding in the sense of being
binding except when some legally specified exception applies. See PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54,
at 139 (institutionalized systems consist of norms that courts must apply and cannot disregard
whenever they find their application undesirable, all things considered); id. at 145 (the norms of
a normative system exclude the application of reasons, standards, and norms that neither belong
to the system nor are recognized by it); see also AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra note 2, at 113. For
Raz, all legal rules are "exclusionary reasons" for disregarding all reasons not allowed by specific
legal doctrine. See id. at 30, 31; PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 54, at 144. Raz seems to suggest
that if a "rule" is regarded as merely prima facie binding, it is not even being used as a rule.
See id. at 60-61, 73. For Raz, legal rules exemplify the first of the four uses of norms mentioned
supra note 4.
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accepted any single rule of recognition concerning the binding status of case
of
law rules. A variety of conflicting judicial opinions as to the binding nature
52
pre-existing case law rules is likely to be found in any American state.'
Third, the positivists could acknowledge that many states do not have any
rule of recognition concerning the binding status of case law rules, and modify
their Legal Obligation Thesis so that it does not apply to case law, but only
to rules expressed in constitutions, statutes, and administrative regulations. But
this modification, like the analogous modification of the Validity Thesis, would
put case law rules outside the scope of a legal system 15 3 and thus leave the
positivists with a model of legal rules that does not account for the numerous
rule-based case law decisions of our courts. The modification would therefore
probably be unacceptable to the positivists.
Since no other viable modification is conceivable, it must be concluded that
the Legal Obligation Thesis cannot be saved. Like the Validity Thesis, the
Legal Obligation Thesis cannot be reformulated so as to conform to American
case law and also accord with the contemporary positivists' model of a legal
system of rules that accounts for all rule-based judicial decisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary legal positivism is distinguished from other analytical philosophies of law by its three central theses: the Validity Thesis, the Separation
Thesis, and the Legal Obligation Thesis. These theses provide a model of
systems of legal rules, systems founded upon rules of recognition that courts
generally accept and that (i) effectively identify legally valid rules (the Validity
Thesis), (ii) need not contain moral criteria for legal validity (the Separation
Thesis), and (iii) make legally valid rules strictly binding from the legal point
of view (the Legal Obligation Thesis).
The Validity Thesis and the Legal Obligation Thesis have been disproved
with respect to American case law. The courts in many states have not generally
accepted any rule of recognition criteria capable of effectively identifying valid
case law rules and have not generally accepted any rule of recognition provision
concerning the binding status of case law rules. Furthermore, it appears unlikely
that the Validity Thesis or the Legal Obligation Thesis could be modified to
conform to the realities of American case law without sacrificing the positivists'
model of a system of legal rules.
The positivists are thus left with the Separation Thesis. The Separation
Thesis, however, addresses the nature of the validity criteria contained in any
rule of recognition, and therefore presupposes the truth of the Validity Thesis.
152. Even if it were established that every state has a generally agreed-upon rule concerning
the binding status of valid case law rules, such a rule would have nothing to operate on if valid
case law rules cannot be identified. The Legal Obligation Thesis presupposes the truth of the
Validity Thesis. See supra § I.E. To be efficacious, a rule of recognition must contain criteria of
validity as well as a provision determining the binding status of valid rules. This article's survey
of case law opinions in four states indicated that in many states, no generally accepted criteria are
capable of effectively identifying legally valid case law rules.
153. See supra note 150.
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If there are no generally accepted criteria of validity for case law rules, the
Separation Thesis cannot apply in the realm of case law. Thus, with respect
to American case law, each of the three central theses of contemporary positivism
is either false or inapplicable.
Any theory that fails to adequately deal with case law should be rejected
as an analytical approach to American law. The volume of statutory and administrative law has greatly expanded in recent decades, and American case
law no longer plays as large a role as it once did. Nevertheless, case law still
plays an important role and should be accounted for in any analysis of the
nature of law. Contemporary legal positivism offers a model of legal rules in
which all rules belong to some normative system regulated by a rule or rules
of recognition. In the realm of case law, however, one usually finds no rule
of recognition and no system. Instead, there exists a diffuse and constantly
changing body of rules, regulated only by a judicial commitment to justice.
This discovery may induce in some a mild case of vertigo. Balance is regained,
not by seeking repose in some illusory model of law, but by accepting case
law as it is, in all its variety and mystery.
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